Olympus Hills Shopping Center, Ltd., a Utah limited partnership v. Smith\\u27s Food & Drug Centers, Inc., a Delaware corporation : Petition for Rehearing by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1993
Olympus Hills Shopping Center, Ltd., a Utah
limited partnership v. Smith\'s Food & Drug
Centers, Inc., a Delaware corporation : Petition for
Rehearing
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Robert S. Campbell, Jr.; E. Barney Gesas; Campbell, Maack and Sessions; Counsel for Appellee.
James S. Jardine; Rick B. Hoggard; Brent D. Wride; Ray, Quinney and Nebeker; Counsel for
Appellant.
This Petition for Rehearing is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court
of Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Petition for Rehearing, Olympus Hills Shopping Center, Ltd., a Utah limited partnership v. Smith\'s Food & Drug Centers, Inc., a Delaware
corporation, No. 930531 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1993).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/5446
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OLYMPUS HILLS SHOPPING 





SMITH'S FOOD & DRUG CENTERS, 
INC., a Delaware corporation, 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
'•ETITION FOR REHEARING OF 
APPELLANT 
SMITH'S FOOD & DRUG 
CENTERS, INC. 
Appeal No. 930531 
ON APPEAL FROM THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE MICHAEL R. MURPHY 
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE: 
Robert S. Campbel] r. 
E. Barney Gesas 
CAMPBELL, MAACK & SESSIONS 
201 South Main, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 537-5555 
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT: 
James S. Jardine (A1647), 
Rick B. Hoggard (A5088), 
Brent D. wride (A5163) 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
79 South Main Street 
P.O. BOX 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
Telephone (001) 532-1500 




DOCKET NO. Wtt[ FILED JAN 121995 
COURT OF APPEALS 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OLYMPUS HILLS SHOPPING 





SMITH'S FOOD & DRUG CENTERS, 
INC., a Delaware corporation! 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
PETITION FOR REHEARING OF 
APPELLANT 
SMITH'S FOOD i DRUG 
CENTERS, INC. 
Appeal NO. 930531 
ON APPEAL FROM THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE MICHAEL R. MURPHY 
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE: 
Robert S. Campbell, Jr. 
E. Barney Gesas 
CAMPBELL, MAACK & SESSIONS 
2 01 South Main, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 537-5555 
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT: 
James S. Jardine (A1647), 
Rick B. Hoggard (AS088), 
Brent D. Wride (A5163) 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
79 South Main Street 
P.O. BOX 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
Telephone: (801) 532-1500 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
REHEARING ISSUES 1 
I. OLYMPUS HILLS' NOTICE OF TERMINATION DID NOT CONTAIN A 
NOTICE OF "ALTERNATIVE OF PERFORMANCE" AS REQUIRED FOR 
UNLAWFUL DETAINER 2 
II. OLYMPUS HILLS' NOTICE OF DEFAULT WAS INSUFFICIENT FOR 
EITHER LEASE FORFEITURE OR TREBLE DAMAGES FOR 
UNLAWFUL DETAINER 4 
III. THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DUTY OF GOOD FAITH 
AND FAIR DEALING LIMITED SMITH'S RIGHT TO CHANGE USES 
UNDER THE LEASE TO A "REASONABLE ECONOMIC USE" 7 
IV. THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DISTRICT COURT 
PROPERLY REFUSED TO INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT SMITH'S HAD 
NO DUTY TO OPERATE AN ANCHOR TENANT-TYPE STORE 10 
A. ANCHOR-TENANT DUTIES ARE INCONSISTENT WITH AN 
UNRESTRICTED USE CLAUSE 11 
B. IN THE PRESENT CASE, ANCHOR-TENANT DUTIES 
IMPERMISSIBLY CONFLICTED WITH SMITH'S ABSOLUTE RIGHT 
TO OPERATE A NON-SUPERMARKET BUSINESS 12 




TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases Pages 
Bentley v. Potter, <SH4 I- Mi *s17 \ \ \ - . . . . , 3, * 
Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 77J )89) xu 
Bradlees Tidewater v. Walnut Hills Inv.,239 ,t 
3 91 S.E.2d 3 04 (1 99 0) , . . 11, 12 
Brehany v. Nordstrom. Inc.. 812 P.2d 49 (Utah 1991 , , . , 8 
Brown v. Safeway Stores. Inc., 617 P.2d (Utah 1980) . . 12 
Dang v. Cox Corp., 655 P.2d 658 (Utah , . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 6 
Dickey v. Philadelphia Minit-Man Corp. , u •S4 9, 
105 A. 2d 580 (1954) . , . . . . . . 9 
Evans v. Grand Union Co., 759 F. Supp. 
(M.D. Ga. 1990) 11 
Hilton Hotels Corp. v. Butch Lewis Prod.. Inc.. 107 Nev. 22 6, 
808 P. 2d 919 (1991) 9 
Mercury Inv. Co. v. F.W. Woolworth Co.. 706 P.2d 523 
(Okla. 1985) . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . it 
Pigglv Wiggly S., Inc. v. Eastgate Assoc. Ltd., 
195 Ga.App. .1 0, 392 S.E.2d 337 (,] 990) . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 
Pingree v. Continental Group. Inc.. 558 P. 2d I !. 17 
(Utah 1976) . . . . . . . . . , , ..".'."...'.. 1, 2 
Rio Algom Corp. v. Jimco Ltd.. 618 P.2d 497 
(Utah 1980) . . . ' . . . ' . . . " " . . 
Russell v. Park City Utah Corp., 548 P.2d 889 (Utah), 
cert, denied. 429 U.S. 860 (1976) , . . . . . . . 4 
Stop & Shop, inc. v. Ganem, 347 Mass. 697, 
200 N.E.2d 248 (1964) . , , . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 
T e^ R^ Brown & Assoc, v. Carnes Corp., 
753 P.2d 964 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 
Williams v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 198 Kan. 331, 
424 P. 2d 541 (1967) . . . , , , , . . . . . 7 
iii 
Zeese v. Estate of Segal. 534 P.2d 85 (Utah 1975) 7 
Statutes 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-1 (1992) 1, 2 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-3 (1986) 2 
Miscellaneous 
Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract, and the Common Law Duty 
to Perform in Good Faith. 94 Harv.L.Rev. 369 (1980) 9 
Annotation, Relief against forfeiture of lease for nonpayment 
of rent. 31 A.L.R.2d 321 (1953) 4 
iv 
REHEARING ISSUES 
Pursuant to Rule 35, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Appellant 
Smith's Food & Drug Centers, Inc. ("Smith's"), respectfully petitions 
the Court for a rehearing on the following issues decided in the Court's 
December 29, 1994, written opinion ("Opinion") affirming the judgment in 
favor of Olympus Hills Shopping Center, Ltd. ("Olympus Hills"): 
1. The Court erred by holding that Olympus Hills' Notice of 
Default satisfied the "alternative of performance" requirement of the 
Utah Unlawful Detainer statute, when by statute the "alternative of 
performance" must be contained in the Notice of Termination (Opinion 
Issue 5). 
2. The Court impermissibly shifted to the lessee the burden of 
ambiguity in a default notice by holding that Olympus Hills' Notice of 
Default was sufficient for forfeiture of the Lease and unlawful detainer 
treble damages when, strictly construing that notice, the only alleged 
default that was tied to possible forfeiture was the fact of closure, 
which the jury determined was not a default (Opinion Issue 5). 
3. The Court's holding that the duty of good faith restricted 
Smith's discretion in changing uses to an economically "reasonable" use 
erroneously conflicts with the well established Utah law favoring 
unrestricted use of leased premises (Opinion Issue 1). 
4. The Court erred by holding that the duty of good faith may be 
used to impose a duty on Smith's to operate an anchor-tenant type 
business despite direct lease language to the contrary, and by holding 
that the district court's refusal to so instruct the jury did not 
constitute reversible error (Opinion Issues 3 and 4). 
1 
!• OLYMPUS HILLS' NOTICE OF TERMINATION DID NOT CONTAIN A NOTICE OF 
"ALTERNATIVE OF PERFORMANCE" AS REQUIRED FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER 
Smith's is entitled to dismissal of Olympus Hills' unlawful 
detainer claim because the Notice of Termination did not contain the 
required "alternative of performance." The Court correctly recognized 
that in the present case, the Utah Unlawful Detainer Statute, Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-36-3(1)(e) (1992), required that Olympus Hills give to Smith's 
a notice of an "alternative of performance" prior to invoking the treble 
damage remedy in that statute. (Opinion at p. 23; cf. Appellant's Brief 
at p. 47; Appellant's Reply Brief at p. 26.) The Court, however, 
erroneously held that the content of Olympus Hills' Notice of Default, 
dated April 27, 1990, satisfied this notice requirement.1 (Opinion at 
pp. 23-24.) This finding was in error because the Utah Supreme Court 
held in Pinaree v. Continental Group of Utah. Inc.. 558 P.2d 1317 (Utah 
1976), that the alternative of performance must be contained in the 
Notice of Termination, and not the Notice of Default as in this case. 
In Pinaree. the landlord sent a notice of default providing for a 
thirty-day cure period. After the expiration of the cure period, the 
landlord then sent a notice of forfeiture that did not contain the 
alternative of performance. The court refused any award of treble 
damages for unlawful detainer: 
*The Court stated: 
Smith's alleges that the April 27, 1990 letter does not 
contain the required "alternative of performance" and that the 
letter's reference to the contractual cure period does not satisfy 
the statutory requirement. The letter states that "[i]n the event 
that Smith's does not immediately re-open and continuously conduct 
normal business operations in the premises, Olympus Hills will 
terminate the Lease . . . as well as seek damages and all other 
available legal relief for the breach." We believe this language 
expresses the alternative of performing or surrendering the 
property. Thus, the notice of default met the requirements of 
section 78-36-3(1)(e). 
(Opinion at pp. 23-24 (emphasis added).) Judge Bench dissented from the majority 
holding on the ground that Olympus Hills' acceptance of rent waived the alleged 
default. (Opinion at pp. 33-34 (Bench J., dissenting).) 
2 
Plaintiff initially sent a letter to defendant on 
September 24, 1974, setting forth deficiencies in the 
maintenance of the premises. Plaintiffs stated, if the 
deficiencies were not corrected within thirty days, "you 
are hereby notified of lessors intent to forfeit, cancel 
and terminate this lease. . . . " 
. . . On February 26, 1975, plaintiffs served notice 
on defendant, which stated they "hereby declare a 
forfeiture" of the lease for the lessee's failure to 
correct the deficiencies set forth in the letter of 
September 24, 1974. 
. • • 
[Plaintiffs' declaration of forfeiture was not 
conditional as required by 78-36-3(5). This court has 
consistently ruled a notice of forfeiture is sufficient 
to terminate a lease for breach of a covenant, but it is 
not sufficient to place the lessee in unlawful detainer. 
This for the reason the statute requires an alternative 
notice, viz., the tenant either perform, or quit; before 
he can be held in unlawful detainer, and be subject to 
treble damages. 
Id. at 1322 (emphasis added).2 The Pinaree ruling is logical because at 
the time of service of a notice of default, the lessor has no right to 
demand performance or surrender of the property within three days of 
that notice. The right to demand surrender of the premises only accrues 
after the expiration of the cure period in the Lease and upon service of 
a notice of termination. 
The notices in this case are indistinguishable from those in 
Pinaree. Although the notice of default in Pinaree provided the lessee 
with the alternative of curing the alleged default, the Court barred the 
lessor from recovering treble damages because the subsequent notice of 
termination did not contain the required alternative of performance. 
Olympus Hills has not, and could not argue that the Notice of 
Termination in this case contained the required alternative of 
performance. Consequently, the treble damage award must be reversed. 
2Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-3(5) (1986), was the predecessor to Utah Code Ann. 
S 78-36-1(e) (1992). 
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II. OLYMPUS HILLSf NOTICE OF DEFAULT WAS INSUFFICIENT FOR EITHER 
LEASE FORFEITURE OR TREBLE DAMAGES FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER. 
Smith's is entitled to dismissal of Olympus Hills' claims for Lease 
forfeiture and unlawful detainer because the Notice of Default, strictly 
construed, did not tie the length of closure to possible forfeiture of 
the Lease. Utah law requires that a notice of default must "plainly 
indicate the nature of the default ... and give reasonable notice that 
failure to cure the default within the time allowed may lead to 
termination." Bentley v. Potter, 694 P.2d 617, 620 (Utah 1984). The 
Court did not recognize, however, that it must "strictly" construe 
notices in evaluating the sufficiency of a notice that may lead to 
forfeiture. See, e.g., Russell v. Park City Utah Corp., 548 P.2d 889, 
891 (Utah), cert, denied, 429 U.S. 860 (1976). The burden or risk of 
any ambiguity in the notice must be borne by the lessor which drafted 
the notice. Dana v. Cox Corp. , 655 P.2d 658, 662 (Utah 1982). Thus, 
the Court impermissibly shifted the burden of ambiguity in a notice to 
the lessee, Smith's, when the Court did not strictly construe the Notice 
of Default as to whether Olympus Hills tied the length of closure to the 
possibility of forfeiture. 
First, the Court indicated that reference in the Notice of Default 
to the provision allegedly breached was sufficient because "[i]t would 
be an unfair burden to require Olympus Hills to anticipate at the time 
of a breach exactly how litigation would evolve in interpreting this 
lease provision and what the jury would find" and, consequently, the 
reference to closure as a breach in the Notice of Default was 
sufficient. (Opinion at p. 23.) However, such a rule is fundamentally 
inconsistent with strict construction of notices leading to forfeiture, 
which policy places the risk of ambiguity upon the lessor who drafts the 
notice. A Notice of Default must not merely identify the breached 
4 
previa ^f* ^ ^ nature : the- default or 
breach." aentley v. Potter, * ' s 
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3 l n
 Bentlev, the Utah Supreme Cour t cited favorably to Annotation, Relief 
against forfeiture of lease for nonpayment of rent, 31 A.L,R.2d 321, § 18 (1953). 
Bentlev. 694 P.2d at 620. Section 18 of that annotation is consistent with Smith's 
argument that the notice must provide sufficient information to enable Smith's to know 
what conduct must be undertaken to cure the alleged default: "The notice or declaration 
of forfeiture, when required, must . . • furnish[] complete information and therefore 
must state i t s purpose, the amount claimed, and the time and place of payment". 31 
A.L.R.2d at 387. 
• Consistent with the policy disfavoring forfeiture, the default description 
must be contained in the Notice of Default and a lessee's alleged subjective knowledge 
of the nature of the alleged default does not satisfy the notice requirement, 
'(Appellant's Reply Brief at pp. 23-24 (cases cited),) 
adverse impact on the established shopping patterns, 
traffic and buying habits of customers at the Shopping 
Center. Our client views the substantial period proposed 
by Smith's to remodel the premises, as a action of 
Smith's, in bad faith, to change shopping habits and to 
divert customers away from the Olympus Hills Shopping 
Center to Smith's newly opened supermarket and drug 
center on 33 00 South 3100 East. Smith's action in 
termination operations on April 24, 1990 is inconsistent 
with its course of conduct in 1985 when the Smith's store 
remained open notwithstanding the substantial remodeling 
project conducted to renovate the Skaggs space. 
In the event Smith's does not immediately re-open 
and continuously conduct normal business operations in 
the premises. Olvmpus Hills will terminate the Lease 
pursuant to paragraph 15 of the Lease Agreement as well 
as seek damages and all other available legal relief for 
the breach. 
(R. 01014-16 (emphasis added).) 
Strictly construing this letter, the only conduct identified as a 
possible cure for the alleged default to avoid possible termination of 
the Lease was the immediate reopening of the business (and remodeling 
while the store was open). Nowhere does Olympus Hills notify Smith's 
that a shorter remodeling schedule would cure part or all of the alleged 
default and avoid forfeiture of the Lease. In fact, immediately 
following the reference cited by the Court, Olympus Hills' letter stated 
that past remodeling occurred while Smith's store remained opened and 
then threatened forfeiture if Smith's did not "immediately re-open" the 
store. Thus, Olympus Hills' Notice of Default was insufficient to 
forfeit the Lease or to create unlawful detainer. Any ambiguity as to 
the nature of the default was Olympus Hills' responsibility and, under 
Utah law, it — not Smith's — must bear the burden of that ambiguity. 
Dang v. Cox Corp., 655 P.2d at 661. 
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I I I . THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DUTY OF GOOD FAITH AND 
FAIR DEALING LIMITED SMITH'S RIGHT TO CHANGE USES UNDER THE 
LEASE TO A "REASONABLE ECONOMIC USEM 
The Court h e l d t h a t "Olympus H i l l s j u s t i f i a b l y e x p e c t e d t h a t 
S m i t h ' s would s e l e c t a r e a s o n a b l e economic u s e f o r t h e p r o p e r t y i n good 
f a i t h " and t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t p r o p e r l y submi t ted t o t h e jury 
Olympus H i l l s ' c l a i m under t h e use c l a u s e i n t h e L e a s e . 5 (Opinion a t p . 
7 . ) The C o u r t ' s u s e of t h e duty of good f a i t h and f a i r d e a l i n g t o l i m i t 
t o a " r e a s o n a b l e economic" u s e S m i t h ' s r i g h t t o change u s e under t h e 
Lease i s an unprecedented r u l i n g and i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h Utah p u b l i c 
p o l i c y f a v o r i n g " f r e e use" of l e a s e d premise s i n t h e absence of any 
e x p r e s s or n e c e s s a r i l y i m p l i e d l i m i t a t i o n on u s e i n a l e a s e . 
S e t t l e d p u b l i c p o l i c y i n Utah f a v o r s u n r e s t r i c t e d u s e of l e a s e d 
p r e m i s e s . In Zeese v . E s t a t e of Siecrel , 534 P.2d 85 (Utah 1 9 7 5 ) , t h e 
Utah Supreme Court s t a t e d : 
A l e s s e e i s e n t i t l e d t o u s e t h e p r e m i s e s f o r any 
l a w f u l or v a l i d purpose w i t h o u t i n t e r f e r e n c e on t h e p a r t 
o f t h e l a n d l o r d , s o l ong as t h e use i s no t forb idden by 
e x p r e s s p r o v i s i o n s of t h e l e a s e or by some n e c e s s a r i l y 
i m p l i e d c o n s t r u c t i o n t h e r e o f , and does not amount t o 
w a s t e or d e s t r u c t i o n of t h e p r o p e r t y . 
I d . a t 89 ( f o o t n o t e o m i t t e d ) . 6 Thus, i n t h e absence of e x p r e s s or 
i m p l i e d - i n - f a c t c o v e n a n t s i n a l e a s e or an a s s e r t i o n of w a s t e , a l e s s e e 
has an u n r e s t r i c t e d r i g h t t o s e l e c t t h e u s e f o r t h e l e a s e d p r e m i s e s . 7 
5Judge Bench dissented from the Court's holding on the claims under the 
use c lause of the Lease. (Opinion at pp. 27-33 (Bench, J . , d i s s e n t i n g ) . ) 
6This po l i cy has been demonstrated in the numerous cases holding that there i s 
no reasonable consent l imi ta t ion on a r ight to ass ign a l ease where there i s no express 
or impl ied- in- fac t l imi ta t ion in the l ease on assignment. See, e . g . . Williams v. 
Safeway Stores , I n c . , 424 P. ,2d 541,548 (Kan. 1967) ( r e s t r i c t i o n s against assignment 
are not favored and are not extended by impl ica t ion) . 
7The duty of good f a i t h in the context of an unlimited use clause could 
s t i l l be used t o prohibit the change to an i l l u s o r y or sham use, such as the proverbial 
c igar s tore or lemonade stand — a s i t u a t i o n not involved in t h i s case . 
7 
The district court properly ruled, as a matter of law, that there 
was no express limitation on use in the Lease. Olympus Hills' has never 
argued that there was an implied-in-fact limitation on use. 
Consequently, in light of Utah's policy of unrestricted use on 
leaseholds, the Court's utilization of the duty of good faith to impose 
on Smith's an obligation to choose an economically reasonable use for 
the leased premises is impermissibly inconsistent with and contradicts 
Smith's express rights under the Lease. See, e.g., Rio Alaom Corp. v. 
Jimco Ltd., 618 P.2d 497, 505 (Utah 1980); Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 
812 P.2d 49, 55 (Utah 1991); Ted R. Brown & Assoc, v. Carnes Corp. , 753 
P.2d 964, 970-71 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
The analysis adopted by the Court thus allowed the jury to 
impermissibly rewrite the carefully negotiated use provision of the 
Lease. See Ted R. Brown & Assocs. v. Carnes Corp., 753 P.2d 964, 970 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988). Olympus Hills could have negotiated a lease that 
either expressly protected expectations of anchor tenancy or business 
productivity, or that conditioned a change in use upon Olympus Hills' 
reasonable consent. However, it did not do so, and to limit a lessee's 
discretion by implying such an expansive and uncertain obligation as 
"commercial reasonableness" would be, in actuality, a redrafting of the 
Lease to add a term that Olympus Hills was unable to obtain through 
negotiation. The Court "should be loath to hold [Smith's] to any 
greater level of business productivity than [Olympus Hills] itself was 
able to exact from [Smith's]." Mercury Inv. Co. v. F.W. Woolworth, 
Inc.. 706 P.2d 523, 532 (Okla. 1985). 
8 
The C o u 1 ^ 'c^ ^ Lninu ^ i l h o a t p r e c e d e d T~ »^«o <_
 t . s 
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determined well 
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* ^ -easrn-tb1 eness * • :.e!t. r-:*.-<- m l c ^ 
citfce: - * • - *ige in use 1 -r* 
ignment - / OL 
«r only precedent cited by the Court considering the role of the di . ^ 
good and fair dealing in the lease context was to percentage rent cases, 
(Opi.^ w.. „ p. 7 (citing Hilton Hotels Corp, v. Butch Lewis Prod., Inc., 808 P.2d 919, 
923-24 n. 6 (Nev. 1991) (citing Burton, Breach of Contract, and the Common Law Duty to 
Perform in Good Faith, 94 Harv.L.Rev. 369, 384-85 (1980)).) However, in the present 
case, based on the district court's unappealed rulings, the duty of good faith with 
respect to the percentage rent clause did not limit Smith's right to conduct business 
operations on the premises. (R. 3522-24.) In any event, the Burton percentage lease 
example was nothing more than recognition of the rule for implied-in-fact covenants in 
percentage rent cases. For example, Burton derived the rule, in part, from the 
decision in Stop & Shop, Inc. v. Ganem, 200 N.E.2d 248 (Mass. 1964), where the court 
found no implied-in-fact covenant of continuous operation in a percentage rent lease. 
The court also held that an allegation of bad faith did not change the result: 
The allegation "not in good faith" adds nothing to tht *.«. ^  stated. 
In context, it says no more than that the plaintiff has acted in 
violation of implied obligations of the lease. 
Id. at 253. Judge .Murphy came to the same conclusion. (R. 3521 ("Woodland is nut. a 
case, of good faith and fair dealing. However, in the context of this case, ... i think 
that there's a difference without a distinction."),) 
extended litigation. Under the Court's ruling, it is difficult, if not 
impossible for lessees to draft use language with any certainty or 
predictable outcome. The Utah Supreme Court has already criticized the 
use of the duty of good faith and fair duty without predictable 
guidelines in the employment context. Berube v. Fashion Centre. 771 
P.2d 1033, 1051-52 (Utah 1989)(Zimmerman, J.). 
IV. THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY 
REFUSED TO INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT SMITHS HAD NO DUTY TO 
OPERATE AN ANCHOR TENANT-TYPE STORE 
The Court also held that the district court did not err in refusing 
to instruct the jury that Smith's had no duty to operate an anchor-type 
business because the duty of good faith "required Smith's to select a 
reasonable economic use for the leased space" and that duty "might have 
required [Smith's] to operate as an * anchor tenant'". (Opinion at p. 16 
(emphasis added).) Even if the duty of good faith could limit Smith's 
selection among non-anchor retail uses, any duty of Smith's to select an 
anchor-type business would impermissibly conflict with and contradict 
the express language of the Lease in this case for two reasons. First, 
courts have repeatedly recognized that an unrestricted use clause gives 
a tenant unlimited discretion to change to a non-anchor business because 
anchor-tenant duties are inconsistent with an unlimited use clause. 
Second, in the present case, there was no evidence that anything other 
than a supermarket could have operated (or would have been considered 
for operation by Olympus Hills) as an anchor tenant in Smith's space. 
Thus, even if Olympus Hills had adduced evidence that there were 
•'commercially reasonable" non-supermarket uses for the leased premises 
(which it did not do) , Olympus Hills' argument regarding anchor tenancy 
impermissibly conflicted with the use clause and was nothing more than 
an attempt to restrict Smith's use of the leased premises to a 
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as to the sales volume")); cf> Mercury Inv. Co, v. F.W. Woolworth Co,. 
706 P.2d 523 (Okla. 1985)(percentage rent disclaimer excludes implied 
covenant to generate percentage rent or customer traffic); Brown v. 
Safeway Stores, Inc.. 617 P.2d 704, 710-12 (Wash. 1980)(unlimited right 
to sublease was inconsistent with implied obligation to "operate and 
assign in a commercially reasonable manner" even for an anchor tenant).9 
As the Virginia Supreme Court held in Bradlees Tidewater v. Walnut Hill 
Investment, 391 S.E.2d 304 (Va. 1990): 
It is obvious why Walnut Hill wants to abandon its 
"anchor tenant" theory. The theory is seriously flawed. 
Under the plain language of the lease in this case, an 
assignee or sublessee was required to play the role of 
anchor tenant only during the first five years of the 
lease, and that period has long since expired. 
• . • 
Hence since the five-year period has expired, [the 
assignees] may conduct any lawful retail business, not 
just a Bradlees-type department store or one otherwise 
qualifying as an anchor.... 
Id. at 308 (emphasis in original). 
This Court's departure from this established law of other 
jurisdictions will inevitably create costly and chaotic uncertainty in 
commercial lease settings. Consequently, as a matter of law, Smith's 
had no duty to operate an anchor-type business and the district court 
erred when it refused to so instruct the jury. 
B. IN THE PRESENT CASE, ANCHOR-TENANT DUTIES IMPERMISSIBLY 
CONFLICTED WITH SMITH'S ABSOLUTE RIGHT TO OPERATE A 
NON-SUPERMARKET BUSINESS 
As long as Smith's operated a supermarket, the Lease provided that 
Smith's had the "exclusive" right to operate a supermarket at Olympus 
Hills. Thus, the only contractual consequence of a decision by Smith's 
9As was noted in Smith's Reply Brief, the distinction between a constructive 
covenant of good faith and an implied-in-fact covenant to operate an anchor-type 
business is immaterial to evaluating whether the alleged duty is inconsistent with the 
express terms of the use clause. (Appellant's Reply Brief at p. 9 n. 7, p. 15 n. 14.) 
12 
to cease supermarket operations . ^ - * <i> egotiated Lease would 
l O S S O f Jilt" £3 €',?,)( I," It, * . 
c e a s e s u p e r m a r k e t operas f a v o r o t h e r l a w f u l r e t a i l s e l l , 
b u s i n e s s e s ) i s i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e e x p r e s s l a n g u a g e 
if S m i t h ' s s e l e c t i o n r e t a i l 
B u s i n e s s e s were t o be l i m i t e d by t h e d u t y : . • ; f a i t h ) . See 
R i o Alaom Corp . v . J imco L t d . , • K * M 
c o n t r a c t p rov ide* 
:;: c \ ill ;:1 i ,c: t: r e s t r i c . , . p a r t i e s ' d i s c r e t i o r making t h e s e l e c t i c 
T h e r e was no e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e r e wac >on-supermarket 
t e n a n t t h a t wou3 s p a c e . 
i inibequeum d i s t r i c t • •*. r e f u s a s t r u c t t'.e _ .. • _ • : -* 
S m i t h ' s had d u t : e r a t e i anchor *~P*^-* i m p e r m i s s i 
c o n f l i c t e d w i t h S m i t h ' - m a r k e t t y p e u s e . 
fl "I IE • O :>uxt erroneous, > pointed ^stimony . ~ Olympus Hi l l s ' 
experts, Mr. Throndsen and Mr. Brubake^ *'•*--"< +*+ lefined the "highf 
and best use" and aii "suggest[ing]" 
• were reasonable non-supermarket uses.1111 However, neither Mr. 
Throndsen ^rubaker tes t i f ied that *> v ^ 
reasonable use iur h isc sji.n i i rondsei 
'l" I ympii,1. Hiil Is experl ' c s t i l i ed that "i major service grocery store 
operatoi the only one who > t ra f f ic to that crater, and tha t ' s 
where the most value i ?:•- h F iecaus '-hat 
" (U £ ! ' 6 4"1J» .. . empnas3s added); see also 645 
a t pp« 275- 290-91 (supermarke. "second generation tenan^ i 
Nei ther t h e Court nor Olympus H i l l s ever i d e n t i f i e d .my non-supermarket 
anchor- type uses for t h e space* Even if t h e r e had been evidmi f a non-supermarket 
•reasonable use (which t h e r e was n o t ) , t h e r e ot; i 11 was iu« evidence cf a non- supermarket 
anchor - type use for t h e Smi th ' s p remises , 
Mr. Brubaker testified that, "It is my opinion that no tenant can make 
a[n adequate] return on their investment other than a supermarket in 
1990 on that space" and that an anchor tenant supermarket was the "key" 
to success of a neighborhood shopping center such as Olympus Hills.11 
(R. 2645 at pp. 15, 59.) In light of the above, testimony, the Court 
erroneously inferred from the respective definitions of highest and best 
use and a reasonable use that there was a reasonable non-supermarket 
anchor-type use. (Cf. Opinion at p. 11 (highest and best use is a 
reasonable use.) 
The Court's opinion suggests it did not consider the testimony of 
Don Nelson, Olympus Hills' leasing agent, who unequivocally testified 
that a supermarket was the only anchor tenant suitable for the Smith's 
space and that uses that may otherwise have been considered as anchor 
tenants in other space, such as Gart Sporting Goods, would not have been 
so considered in Smith's space. (R. 3947-50.) Moreover, at the time of 
the alleged default, Olympus Hills clearly took the position that it 
would not approve a sublease of the Smith's space except to a 
Mr. Brubaker testified as follows: 
Q. Mr, Brubaker, is it your opinion that no tenant is going 
to want to occupy this space other than the supermarket in 1990? 
A. It is my opinion that no tenant can make a return on 
their investment other than a supermarket in 1990 on that space. 
Q. By return of investment, if someone shows a dollar 
profit a year, does that come within your return of investment 
criteria? 
A. Let me say an adequate return on their investment. 
. . . 
Q. A lot of other types of business[es] could make a profit 
and get an adequate return on their investment other than a big 
supermarket combo store, couldn't they. 
A. I do not think so. . . . 
. . . 
A. I believed that some, not a lot, there may be some other 
uses that could make a profit in that location. I believe that the 
probability of profitability for those other uses would not be near 
as great as the use as a supermarket. 
(R. 2645 at pp. 59, 73.) Thus, even though there may be a few non-supermarket uses 
that could generate a profit (which was not Mr. Brubaker's definition of a reasonable 
economic use), only a supermarket could generate an "adequate return" on investment 
(which was his definition). 
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supermarket. (R. 5189-92, 5210, 5215-18, 3822; cf^ R. 4882, 4028-29.) 
Consequently, Olympus H i l l s ' anchor tenant theory was merely an attempt 
t o impose an obl igat ion on Smith's to operate a supermarket. 
C. THE DISTRICT COURT'S RULINGS ON ANCHOR TENANCY WERE 
PREJUDICIAL 
The t r i a l court candidly recognized t h a t any er ror on i t s pa r t 
regarding the anchor-tenant issue would r e s u l t in s ign i f i can t e r ror a t 
t r i a l . 1 2 (R. 3680.) Given the emphasis a t t r i a l by Olympus Hi l l s of 
Smith's al leged anchor-tenant du t i e s , even i f some of the anchor tenant 
evidence may be otherwise admissible (see Opinion a t pp. 12-13), Smith's 
was e n t i t l e d to an ins t ruc t ion t ha t Smith's had no duty to operate an 
anchor-type business . For t h i s reason alone, Smith's i s e n t i t l e d to a 
new t r i a l on the use and continuous operations claims.13 
CONCLUSION 
Smith's i s e n t i t l e d to dismissal of Olympus H i l l s ' claims for 
fo r f e i t u r e of the Lease, t r e b l e damages for unlawful deta iner and 
damages for breach of the use c lause . Smith's i s a l so e n t i t l e d to a new 
t r i a l on Olympus H i l l s ' claim for breach of the continuous operations 
clause and, i f the Court does not grant Smith's request for dismissal , 
a l so on the use claim. The undersigned hereby c e r t i f i e s t ha t t h i s 
Pe t i t i on for Rehearing i s presented in good f a i th and not for delay. 
12At the end of the f i r s t day of t r i a l , the court explained why i t s 
overruled Smith's object ion t o Olympus H i l l s ' anchor-tenant argument during opening 
statement, and then s ta ted: 
If I am wrong on that rul ing , Mr. Jardine, then we w i l l have error 
throughout the t r i a l . And as a re su l t — I am thinking as a lawyer 
— I don't think you're going to be prejudiced i f you don't pop up 
every time, because I guarantee you there w i l l be error throughout 
t h i s t r i a l i f I'm wrong on that , and you lo se on the covenant of 
good f a i t h and f a i r deal ing . 
(R. 3680.) 
13The anchor tenant issue not only dealt with Smith's selection of the Buy 
*N Save, but was also directly relevant to whether closure of the leased premises for 
remodeling was material. 
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